Abstract: A pricing-based non-cooperative game is proposed to stimulate cooperation and perform spectrum allocation in multirelay cooperative transmission networks. The authors construct a buyers' market competition model to consider that multiple relays are willing to share their spectrum resources with a single user. Both the benefits of the relays and the user are concerned in the game. First, according to the current user's demand, the relays as sellers compete with each other to determine the price of relaying that can maximise their profits. Then to maximise its utility, the user purchases the optimal amount of spectrum resources from each relay. The existence of the Nash equilibrium (NE), that is, the solution of the game, is proved. Even though the NE can be obtained in a centralised manner, a distributed algorithm to search for the NE is developed, which is more applicable in practical systems. Also, the convergence conditions of the algorithm are also analysed. Furthermore, the authors have also proved that the NE is not efficient when considering the total relays' profits. Thus, a general method to find the global optimal solution that maximises the total relays' profits is given. Simulation results show, by using the game, that a reasonable spectrum allocation can be performed between the relays and the user.
Introduction
The basic idea of cooperative transmission is to allow nodes in a network to help relay information for each other, which would exploit the inherent spatial diversity in the relay channels [1, 2] to obtain diversity gain. Several cooperative transmission protocols such as amplify and forward, decode and forward and decode and re-encode protocols have been proposed in [3 -5] , and the physical-layer performance is analysed in terms of outage probabilities and symbol error rate in [3 -7] . However, the requirements of cooperative relaying on higher layers and the corresponding effects have not been widely studied. Since the maximum achievable throughput of the relay channel is higher than that of direct source-to-destination transmission [8, 9] , to ensure or even improve this good property guaranteed by the cooperative transmission, it would be better if the following two questions can be well solved: (i) How to determine suitable relays out of a set of candidate relays? (ii) Once the relays are selected, how should the relays reasonably allocate their scarce resources to help relay the information of other individuals?
To solve the above two problems, the authors in [10] proposed a distributed relay selection scheme that requires limited network knowledge and was based on instantaneous signal-to-noise ratios (SNRs). In [11] , relay selection, power management and subcarrier assignment were investigated for multi-user orthogonal frequency division multiple access networks. Most of the existing works in this area assume relays are willing to sacrifice their resources (e.g. energy or bandwidth) for the benefits of others'. However, this assumption is not reasonable for commercial networks, because each autonomous individual only cares about its own benefits by consuming its resources. Thus, some mechanisms that can stimulate the selfish individuals to help others are needed if the cooperation is performed. This is the motivation for our research in this paper.
Game theory can be applied to perform an incentive mechanism to stimulate the cooperation between individuals in the network, since it studies how selfish nodes interact and cooperate with each other in a distributed way. In this area, a generous tit-for-tat algorithm was proposed in [12] to help each node determine the willingness of cooperation based on its own historical statistics. In [13] , a game theoretic algorithm that encourages forwarding among nodes through a reimbursing forwarding scheme was presented for multi-hop wireless networks. Based on the results given in [13] , the authors of [14] studied a twoperson bargaining problem to solve the cooperation bandwidth allocation strategy based on the Nash bargaining solution of cooperative game. Both research results presented in [13, 14] regarded the access point as the destination. As for ad hoc networks, in [15, 16] , distributed relay selection and power allocation for multi-user cooperative communication networks using buyer/seller game were studied. Also, in [17] , auction theory was explored, the problem of which was formulated as a sellers' market competition, where a relay wanted to coordinate the power allocation among multiple user nodes.
In this paper, we consider the bandwidth allocation problem in cooperative transmission networks. Different from [17] , we formulate this problem as a buyers' market competition in which multiple potential relays compete with each other in terms of price to gain profits by selling resources, that is, spectrum, to a single user. Moreover, we use a non-cooperative price game to jointly consider the benefits (i.e. 'utilities' in the game theory literature) of the relays and the user. For the relay node, its utility is defined as the revenue earned from selling parts of its spectrum resources to the user minus the resultant cost of the quality of service (QoS) degradation of its own traffic. For the user, its utility is defined as a quadratic concave function that mainly describes the achievable data throughput minus the total payment to the relays for spectrum consumption. The main objective of this game is to increase revenue of the relays and maximise profits of the user at the same time. Nash equilibrium (NE) is the solution of the game.
Although the game can be solved in a centralised manner, the relays must obtain the pricing information and the corresponding utilities of all the other individuals in the network, which will bring considerable overheads and exchanges of information and is not reasonable in practical applications. Thus, we propose a distributed dynamic price update algorithm for the relays which only depends on the relays' history price strategy and the interaction with the user. Besides, the convergence condition of the algorithm is analysed using local stability analysis. Thus, the game can converge to the NE (when it exists) by performing the algorithm distributively and iteratively.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 gives the system model and the expression of system throughput. Section 3 defines the utility functions of the user and the relays, and formulates the spectrum allocation problem as a game. The distributed algorithm for solving the game is introduced in Section 4. Section 5 presents the performance evaluation results. Conclusions are stated in Section 6. Fig. 1 shows the network model. A transmitter -receiver pair including a source s and a destination d is referred to as a user, and the source could be a single node or a flow with a sequence of nodes. The nodes closer to the destination are the potential relays. The two-step cooperative transmission from s to d includes (i) s transmits information to the relay and (ii) s and the relay transmit information to d simultaneously. We consider an FDMA-based system employing the amplify-and-forward (AF) protocol. Each individual is allocated bandwidth of W hertz for transmission. As in [2, 3] , we assume the transmission power is fixed, and the energy required for relaying a packet is constant.
System model and assumptions

System model
Let I ¼ {1, 2, . . . , N} denotes the set of available potential relays for a user at a certain time. If relay i, i [ I, decides to split w i /W (0 ≤ w i ≤ W ) fraction of its bandwidth to help the user, it will relay w i /W fraction of the data originating from the source s. And this part of data will be transmitted through the two-step cooperative transmission, occupying w i Hz bandwidth of both the relay's and the user's. However, the remaining (W 2 S i¼1 N w i )/W fraction of the source's data can only be directly transmitted to the destination with W 2 S i¼1 N w i Hz bandwidth of the user's. What's more, during the cooperative transmission process, the relays may have their local data to be transmitted. Thus, like the assumption made in [14] , here we assume if relay i, i [ I, currently uses w i Hz bandwidth for the user's cooperative transmission, its local data can be transmitted only through its remaining W 2 w i Hz bandwidth simultaneously.
Throughput analysis
A wireless user always wants to achieve high throughput and low energy consumption at the same time. This tradeoff can be quantified by using the function of the ratio of the achieved throughput to the transmission power [18] , that is
where T and p are the user's throughput and transmission power, respectively. The throughput T is related to the power via g, which denotes the received SNR of the wireless channel from the transmitter to the receiver, and is interpreted as the number of information bits successfully received per second. Equation (1) is then interpreted as the number of information bits successfully received per joule of energy consumed, that is, b/J. Considering that a user transmits L data bits packed into a frame of M (M . L) bits at rate Rb/s with bandwidth of W Hz, the user's throughput can be expressed as
where
M is the probability of correct reception of a frame, which has a mathematical anomaly in its formulation in case of p ¼ 0, as analysed in [18] . To solve the problem, authors of [18] develop the following approximate function that we also adopt in our paper
In this paper, we employ BER(g) ¼ 1/2exp(2g/2) for the binary non-coherent frequency shift keying (2FSK). Equation (1) was first introduced in [18] , and has been used by others in scenarios where energy efficiency is crucial, for example, [19 -21] .
For further analysis, we have R ¼ hW, where h in b/(s . Hz) is the spectrum efficiency. Since we adopt 2FSK as the 
We employ the AF cooperative transmission protocol in the system. Other protocols can be considered in a similar way.
, g s,i and g i,d denote the SNRs of the wireless channels from s to d, s to the relay i and the relay i to d, respectively. According to [3, 14, 15, 17] , the effective SNR of the user helped by the relay i under the AF cooperative channel is
, ∀i [ I
Then the throughput of a user helped by multiple relays in the cooperative transmission network can be expressed as
where p is the transmission power of the source s,
)/M is the throughput of the source's (W 2 S i¼1 N w i )/W fraction data, which is derived from the direct source-to-destination transmission.
i )/M is the throughput of the source's S i¼1 N w i /W fraction data, which is derived from the two-step cooperative transmission with the help of N relays. For simplicity, we assume that the total bandwidth demand of a user should satisfy S i¼1 N w i ≤ W.
3 Game model for resource sharing
Game formulation
For a relay node, relaying represents both a real cost of resource expenditure and an opportunity cost of possible QoS degradations for its local data. That is because parts of the relay's resources are shared with the user, and the relay can only use the remaining resources for its own local data, which may cause possible throughput degradations or traffic delays. However, the relay could compensate this cost by selling its resources to the user, and the received payoff can then be used for transmitting its data in the future when it needs help from others. For a user, given the service price charged by the relays, it would like to get the most benefits at the least payment. In this section, we employ a pricingbased cooperative transmission game (PCTG), to jointly consider the benefits of the relays and the user. In the PCTG, the relays want to get the highest profits by controlling the price of their supplied resources. Since there are multiple relays, the competition between them must be considered. In such cases, the relays have to set proper prices to make sure the following two situations: (i) relays having good channel conditions to the users can set high price to furthest maximise their utility and (ii) relays that do not have so good channel conditions to the users can set low price to attract users' purchase for fear that no user would buy any bandwidth from them. Define a relay's strategy as the price per unit of bandwidth that it chooses to charge the user. The optimal price strategy of a relay depends not only on its own channel conditions to the user, but also on its counterparts' price strategies. Since each relay aims to maximise its own profits, the competition between the relays acting as the sellers is actually a strategic non-cooperative game.
Furthermore, the PCTG is a kind of dynamic/multi-stage game in nature, and it has the following two properties: (i) a relay has priority to charge a price over the user and (ii) in each game stage, the relays simultaneously choose strategies to maximise their profits without knowing the current strategies adopted by the other relays. The reason is that, in practical ad hoc networks, nodes could be out of transmission range of each other, so they cannot exchange the price information with each other. However, each relay knows its own past price strategies and can obtain the information of the user's demand. Thus, in the following, we will show how the game performs only with the information we mentioned above. We first give the user's profit function to calculate the user's optimal bandwidth demand from each relay, and then we define the relays' utility function and solve the NE of the PCTG.
Benefits analysis of the user
A user in the PCTG aims to obtain the most benefits at the least possible payment. Referring to [22] , here we also apply a commonly used quadratic function as the user's profit function as follows
T represents the user's throughput which is defined in (6). S i¼1 N c i w i is the total payment from the user to the relays for spectrum consumption, where c i is the price per unit of bandwidth set by the relay i, and the last term in (7) is derived from [22] . With the last term, differentiating this quadratic profit function (7) will obtain a linear bandwidth demand function, which makes the following analysis tractable, and more details can be found in [22] . We assume v (0 , v , 1) and s are constants, the effects of which to the final results are analysed in the following simulation section (Section 5). Substituting (6) into (7), we have
is the successful reception probability increase per frame through the twostep cooperation transmission helped by the relay i compared with the direct source-to-destination transmission.
Given the prices charged by the potential relays, that is, c ¼ {c 1 , . . . , c N }, the optimisation bandwidth demand problem for a user can be formulated as
where w ¼ {w 1 , . . . , w N } is the set consisting of the amount of bandwidth the user would like to buy from the relays. Then, we take the first derivative of (8) with respect to w i and set each resultant function to be zero to have a series of equations as
The solution of (10) , that is, w * ¼ {w 1 * , . . . , w N * }, represents the optimal bandwidth demand of the user from the relays, which can be expressed as
Proof: Equation (10) can be transformed as
Adding the N equations given in (14) and rewriting the resulting equation, we have
Then we obtain
Substituting (16) into (14), after some manipulation we can obtain the solution as shown in (11). We assume that w i * ≥ 0 for i [ I to ensure that the user's bandwidth purchase from a relay is non-negative. So far, given the spectrum resource prices {c i } i¼1 N of all the relays, the user's optimal bandwidth demand that maximises its profit function (8) is obtained. So next, we will analyse the behaviour of the relays in our PCTG, which is how the relays acting as the game candidates choose the optimal price strategy to maximise their utility function.
Benefits analysis of the relays
As the assumption made in Section 2.1, the relay not only relays the user's information, but also has its own local information to be transmitted. And if the relay splits portions of its bandwidth to help the user relay, its local data can only be transmitted through the remaining bandwidth, which means QoS degradation of the relay's local data may occur, for example, decreased throughput or increased delay. Thus, a relay in the PCTG is willing to maximise its profits under the QoS constraint of its own information.
The QoS satisfaction perceived by a best-effort user can be described as a concave function with respect to the bandwidth w.
where a, b and d are non-negative constants. The concave property of (17) is consistent with the 'Law of Diminishing Marginal Utility' which states that for any good or service, the marginal utility of that good or service decreases as the quantity of the good increases. In other words, total utility increases more and more slowly as the quantity consumed increases. In our PCTG, this law of economics illustrates that as a relay increases consumption of bandwidth for transmitting its local data, there is a decline in the marginal utility of Q(w) that the relay derives from consuming each additional unit of bandwidth.
The utility function for a relay in the PCTG is defined as follows
The first term is the user's payment for bandwidth purchase to the relay i. For the relay i, since w i Hz bandwidth is used for relaying the user's data, the QoS satisfaction of the relay's local data with the total bandwidth W Hz is decreased by that with the remaining W 2 w i Hz. Thus, Q(W ) 2 Q(W 2 w i ) represents the QoS degradation of the relay's local data. Also, a is a parameter to evaluate the QoS sensitivity of a relay. A relay with a larger value of a is more sensitive to its QoS level, that is, it will set a higher price to compensate its QoS degradation, while a relay with a smaller value of a is more sensitive to its profits, that is, it will choose a lower price to attract more spectrum consumption from the user.
Solving the game
This profit function (18) ensures that the relay itself could adjust its service price to compensate the cost of its QoS degradation. From (11), we can see that the user's optimal spectrum demand from relay i, that is, w * i , i [ I, is a function related to spectrum resource prices c ¼ {c 1 , . . . , c N } of all the relays. Then the optimal price strategy for relay i, i [ I, is formulated as
For all i [ I, the price c * i is called the best-response strategy of the relay i by definition, given the other relays' strategies. And the best strategy set of all the relays, that is, c * ¼ {c 1 * , . . . , c N * }, then constructs the NE of the PCTG, that is, the solution of the game. Under the NE, no relay can increase its profits by choosing a different strategy, given other relays' strategies [23] .
Theorem 1: NE exists in the PCTG.
The proof of the above theorem can be found in Appendix.
Mathematically, to obtain NE, that is, to solve (19), we take the first derivative of (18) with respect to c i and set the resultant function to be zero to have
Substituting (11) into (20), we can obtain the following equation set
Solving the above equation set for the unknowns c ¼ {c 1 , . . . , c N }, we can obtain the NE of the PCTG. In (21) , c 2i ¼ {c 1 , . . . , c i21 , c i+1 , . . . , c N } represents the set of strategies adopted by all except the ith relays, and (21) in a centralised manner requires complete information, that is, c 2i and DF 2i should be available to each relay, which will bring considerable overhead and signalling of information in networks and not be feasible in real network considering that relays maybe out of the transmission range of each other. Consequently, a distributed algorithm to search for the NE of the PCTG should be developed, by which each relay can update its price strategy only according to its historical strategies and the user's demand. In the next section, we shall discuss it in detail.
Distributed algorithm for solving the game
Distributed algorithm for searching for the NE
Considering the practical requirement of wireless ad hoc networks, the potential relays can observe the spectrum demand from the user other than the price strategies adopted by its counterparts. Thus, a distributed price update algorithm, which only depends on the interaction between the relays and the user, is required for the relays to search for the NE of the PCTG. First, the best-response function (22) is given, which is defined as the best strategy of one player given the other players' strategies [22] .
where c i ≥ 0 for all i [ I. Equation (22) captures the fact that the utility of a relay is affected by the other relays' strategies. The best strategy set of all the relays, that is, c * ¼ {c 1 * , . . . , c N * }, is the NE. The distributed algorithm for searching the NE is based on the best-response function. Let c i (t) denotes the price charged by relay i, i [ I, at game stage t. Referring to [22] , the price charged by the relay i at game stage t + 1 is computed by
where u i is the speed adjustment parameter of the relay i which can be determined in a centralised way and then broadcasted to all the transmitters. In the simulations, we set u i ¼ u i+1 , 1 ≤ i ≤ N 2 1 to ensure the synchronisation of the convergence of the distributed algorithm to all the relays. This price update function (23) is based on the marginal profit function in microeconomics. By definition in [24] , marginal profit is the term referred to the remaining total, when marginal cost is subtracted from marginal revenue. Using the marginal approach to maximise profits, a firm should continue producing a good until marginal profit is zero. Therefore each relay i's, i [ I, best price in the PCTG should ensure that ∂R i /∂c i ¼ 0 at any time. Otherwise, if relay i charges a lower price than the optimal one at game stage t, ∂R i /∂c i (t) will change from zero to positive. According to (23) , the relay i will increase its price at game stage t + 1 to maximise its profits. While if relay i charges a higher price than the optimal one, ∂R i / ∂c i (t) will change from zero to negative. Then the relay i will decrease its price at game stage t + 1.
The algorithm of (23) is a bidirectional update algorithm, since the relay could adjust its price in any direction to maximise its benefits. As a consequence, starting from any price set with positive values c ¼ {c 1 , . . . , c N }, the algorithm (23) will eventually reach the equilibrium state. Once the equilibrium state is reached, the condition
is satisfied. This condition is taken as the termination condition of the distributed price update algorithm (23) , which means no relay can unilaterally improve its profits by choosing a different price. Then the NE is obtained. In the next section, we will analyse the stability of this distributed algorithm.
Stability analysis of the distributed algorithm
Stability is important for the distributed price update algorithm (23) to reach the NE at the steady state. We investigate the stability conditions of the algorithm (23) by considering the eigenvalues of its Jacobian matrix as proposed in [22] . The Jacobian matrix of (23) is defined as
According to Routh-Hurwitz theorem [25] , the algorithm is stable, that is, the best-response price function (23) converges to the NE, if and only if all the eigenvalues l i of the Jacobian matrix (25) are inside the unit circle (i.e. |l i | , 1, ∀i [ I). Next, we give the stability conditions for the algorithm (23) of a two-relay system, the corresponding Jacobian matrix of which is expressed as
As for the two-relay system, that is, N ¼ 2, (12) and (13) can be expressed as
,
Then, it is easy to obtain the following results
where w i ¼ X 1 (c 2i ) 2 c i X 2 , i ¼ 1, 2. Since this matrix (26) is neither diagonal nor triangular, the characteristic equation to obtain the eigenvalues is given as follows [22] (l 1 , l 2 ) = (
Once the condition |l i | , 1, i ¼ 1, 2 is satisfied, the algorithm (23) is stable, which means the NE is obtained. We can learn that the stability of the algorithm depends largely on the relationship between the speed adjustment parameter u i and Df (g s,d i ), once other parameters are fixed. In a similar way, the stability conditions for the algorithm (23) for a system including an arbitrary number of relays can be achieved.
As is known, the NE is usually inefficient, and the proof of whether the obtained NE of our PCTG is efficient or not can be found in Appendix (Section 9.2).
Performance evaluation and analysis
To evaluate the performance of the proposed spectrum allocation scheme, and decide at what price each relay should sell their spectrum resources and how many spectrum resources the user should buy from the relays, we set up the simulations consisting of a two-relay case and a multi-relay case in this section. Besides, for the two-relay case, the convergence of the price update algorithm (23) and the improvement of the NE, that is, a Pareto dominant solution, are shown, too.
In 
Two-relay case
As illustrated in Fig. 2 , we consider a network in which the source (s) and the destination (d ) are located at (50, 0) and (50, 400), respectively. We fix one of the relay nodes, that is, Relay 1, at (100, 80) , and the other relay, that is, Relay 2, moves along y ¼ 80 with its x coordinate varying from 250 to 400. We assume the transmission power of the source and relays are 0.1 and 0.05 W, respectively, and s in (7) is set to be 1 × 10
26
. In the price update function (23), we set u i ¼ 1 × 10
, i ¼ 1, 2. In the following, we shall show how the two relays compete and influence each other in our proposed PCTG. Fig. 3 shows the NE prices of the relays' spectrum resources, and Fig. 4 shows the user's 
Results analysis:
is closer to the user than Relay 2 is. Thus, compared with Relay 2, Relay 1 can split more bandwidth to help the user, and set a higher resource price to obtain more profits. When 0 , X r2 , 100, Relay 2 is closer to the user than Relay 1 is, thus, the corresponding results of two relays reverse. When X r2 ¼ 50, Relay 2 is in its best location to help the user during its moving, so both the amounts of the user's bandwidth purchase from Relay 2 and the resource price of Relay 2 reach the maximum and that from and of Relay 1 the minimum. When X r2 ¼ 0 and X r2 ¼ 100, both relays have the same channel conditions, that is, the distance to the user. Thus, a fair spectrum allocation is achieved with the same resource price of the two relays. When X r2 . 100, Relay 2 becomes less competitive than Relay 1, as it is moving away from the user. Consequently, both the amounts of the user's bandwidth purchase from Relay 2 and the resource price of Relay 2 drop below that from and of Relay 1.
The utilities of the two relays and the user are shown in Figs. 5 and 6, respectively. When 250 ≤ X r2 ≤ 50, Relay 2 approaches to the user, so the user can use Relay 2 more to help its transmission. Thus, both the utilities of Relay 2 and the user keep increasing even though Relay 2's resource price increases too. Since the amount of the user's bandwidth purchase from Relay 1 decreases, Relay 1 has to decrease its resource price in order to attract the user's buying, which causes the decrease of Relay 1's utility. When X r2 . 50, Relay 2 moves away from the user, and the corresponding results of the two relays reverse.
When Relay 2's utility is less than zero, it quits the competition. Then, the amount of user's bandwidth purchase from Relay 1 continues increasing smoothly. Thus, Relay 1 can slightly increase its resource price to improve its utility. As for the user, despite of the increasing spectrum resource price, it would keep buying from Relay 1 as long as its utility is beyond zero. We assume Relay 2 will hold the price when it quits. Hence, Relay 1 cannot increase its resource price too much; otherwise Relay 2 would rejoin the competition. Finally, the spectrum resource price of Relay 1, the user's bandwidth demand and Relay 1's utility maintain constant. Moreover, we can see that, after Relay 2 quits, the small increases of both the user's bandwidth purchase from Relay 1 and the resource price of Relay 1 are not enough for the user to improve its utility, so the user's utility continues decreasing compared with the point when Relay 2 quits and finally to a constant. Fig. 7 shows the user's energy efficiency increase under the system we constructed in Section 2 compared with the direct source-to-destination transmission, which can be expressed as ( W) )/p. The maximal energy efficiency increase can also be obtained when Relay 2 is in its best location to help the user. The figure shows that the cooperative system we use in this paper can achieve a considerable energy efficiency increase compared with the non-cooperative system.
Here the x coordinate of the relay represents the channel conditions, since time-varying fading is not considered. If channel effects are considered, the x-axis is the channel conditions other than the x coordinate of the relay. Seen from all the above analysis, the questions that what price the relay should ask for and how much bandwidth the user should buy have been clearly illustrated.
Influence of the parameter a to the result:
The influence of the parameter a i , i ¼ 1, 2, in (18) to the NE price is shown in Fig. 8 . Simulation results are consistent with what we have discussed in Section 3.3. With a larger value of a, relays set higher prices in order to compensate the cost of the QoS degradation. While with a smaller value of a, relays choose lower prices to attract the user's buying so as to improve their profits.
Influence of the parameter s to the result:
The influences of the parameter s to the NE price and to the user's bandwidth demand are shown in Figs. 9 and 10 , respectively. We can see that s has no influence on the relays' spectrum resource price. However, the larger the value of s is, the less amount of bandwidth the user needs from both relays.
Convergence analysis of the distributed algorithm:
As analysed in Section 4.2, for the two-relay case, the price update algorithm (23) is stable when the condition |l i | , 1, i ¼ 1, 2, is satisfied. Fig. 11 shows the stability region of algorithm (23) under v ¼ 0.5 when Relay 2 is at the point (50, 80).
The convergence of the proposed price update algorithm (23) is testified in Fig. 12 , for the cases that v ¼ 0.5, and Relay 2 is at (50, 80) with different values of u i , i ¼ 1, 2. We can see that the speed adjustment parameter can only affect the iterations that it takes for the price update algorithm to converge but not the set of the final NE. The convergence of the algorithm with the same value of u has synchronicity. With the stability conditions given in Section 4.2 being satisfied, the larger the value of u is, the less the number of iterations that the convergence to the NE takes. The unstable result is shown as those of u 1 ¼ 4.5 × 10 26 and u 2 ¼ 3 × 10
26
, the values of which are chosen according to the results in Fig. 11 . We can see the unstable curve fluctuates up and down at stable point. The fast convergence of the price update algorithm shows that the proposed distributed implementation only requires small overheads in exchanging the price information between the user and the relays.
Improvement of the NE:
As proved in Appendix (Section 9.2), the NE of our PCTG is inefficient, which means the total utilities of the relays are not maximised. Thus, we set up the following function for solving the global optimal solutions
For the two-relay case where Relay 1 is fixed at (100, 80) and Relay 2 moves, Fig. 13 shows the price strategies of the relays under the global optimal solution compared with those under the NE, and the corresponding comparison of the total relays' utilities is show in Fig. 14 . Under the global optimal situation, both relays' spectrum resource prices are higher than those under the NE and the total utilities of the two relays are improved too, which is consistent with what we have analysed in Appendix Fig. 10 Influence of s to the user's bandwidth demand Fig. 9 Influence of s to the NE Fig. 11 Stability region when Relay 2 is at (50, 80) Fig. 12 Convergence to the NE when Relay 2 is at (50, 80) Fig. 13 Comparison of the price strategy of global optimum and NE (Section 9.2). We conclude in Appendix (Section 9.2) that there must exist somem . 1 that can give a price set {mc
, and utilities of all the relays at {mc
are larger than that at the NE {c * i } i¼1 N . Under the global optimal situation, it is cooperation between the relays that leads to the improvement of the relays' total utilities. However, each individual in the network has the nature of selfishness and they may only concern their own profits. Thus, there may exist betrayers in the whole collectivity, who disobey the total profit maximisation rule. Fig. 14 also gives the result under the circumstance when Relay 1 aims at maximising its own profits (18) while Relay 2 aims at maximising the total system profits (29). The total system profits when Relay 1 betrays is less than the global optimal results but more than the NE results. Thus, although the total utilities are maximised, the global optimal aimed solution is not stable compared with the NE.
Multi-relay case
In the multi-relay case, relay nodes are randomly located in a square region with both x and y coordinates varying from 0 to 200. And the location of the user is the same as that in the two-relay case. The transmission power of the source and relays are assumed to be 1 and 0.5 W, respectively, and s in (7) is set to be 1 × 10
24
. For the price update function (23), we set u i ¼ 1 × 10
25
, for all i [ I. Each point in the figures represents results averaged over 100 randomly generated network topologies. In Fig. 15 , we can observe that as the total number of available relays increases, the user's bandwidth demand increases too, which means the competitions among relays will become more severe. Thus, the average spectrum resource price decreases so as for the relays to attract more consumption from the user and to improve profits.
Conclusions
In this paper, we propose a non-cooperative pricing game theoretic framework for spectrum allocation in cooperative transmission networks. In this game, the benefits of the relays and the user are jointly considered. Besides, if a portion of a relay's bandwidth is shared with the user, degradation in the QoS performance of the relay's local data may occur, so the relay's QoS performance is also concerned in the definition of its utility function. Furthermore, the existence of the solution of the game, that is, NE is proved, and a distributed algorithm instead of the unfeasible centralised algorithm is developed to find the NE. We also prove the inefficiency of the NE and give a general method to find a global optimal solution that maximises the total relays' utilities. Simulation results show that, under the proposed game, the relays and the user could determine what price they should ask for and how much bandwidth it should buy, respectively. What's more, the unstable status of the global optimal solution compared with the NE is also given. 
As assumed in Section 3.2 that 0 , v , 1, we can obtain that X 2 . 0 by its expression in (13), so (∂ 2 R i /∂c i 2 ) , 0. Moreover, it is obvious that R i is continuous in c i through the definition of R i in (18) . So, when c i ≥ 0, R i is strictly concave in {c i } i¼1 N . A strictly concave function must be a quasi-concave one. So, the second condition of Theorem 2 is satisfied too. NE does exist in PCTG. Thus, Theorem 1 is proved. A
Inefficiency of NE
As is well known, the NE is generally inefficient. If it is possible to increase the utility of some of the relays without decreasing that of the other relays, the more efficient price strategy, that is, Pareto dominant or optimal, is obtained. N . The NE is not efficient. However, how to find a Pareto optimum is not within the scope of this paper. Moreover, in Section 5.1.5, we give a general method to search for the Pareto dominant solution of our PCTG with effective simulation results.
